Good Government? (Introduction) by Moore, Mick
It is little more than three years since the Berlin Wall
began to crumble. In that time, the political context
and content of development aid to the Third World
has changed rather dramatically. ‘Political
conditionality’ – the tying of official aid
disbursements to the quality of government (or
‘governance’) that recipients provide – has become
the norm. The idea of relating foreign aid to the type
or quality of government has a long history.
However, it has been applied only sporadically and
inconsistently; and, in practice, it was often a matter
of supporting one’s actual or potential allies in the
Cold War context.2
Two related changes have occurred within the past
three years:
z All major aid donors have begun to insist that
‘good government’ is important.
z There has emerged a common core of ideas
about what ‘good government’ might mean,
albeit with some important differences between
different donors (see below). These ideas concern
the ways in which states relate to the people and
societies over which they rule, not (centrally or
overtly) geopolitical stances or attitudes to
Communism.
There is a new orthodoxy which is likely to be with
us for the foreseeable future. ‘Political conditionality’
is beginning to rival ‘economic conditionality’ in aid
allocation – with ‘environmental conditionality’ also
pushing its way to the top table.
Why the new political conditionality?
What happened? Most observers and contributors to
this IDS Bulletin have little doubt about the
immediate and major reason for the emergence of
political conditionality: the collapse of the Soviet
Bloc and of Communist rule throughout Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union put an end to
the competition between East and West for
influence in the Third World. The uses of aid need no
longer be shaped by geopolitical considerations and
compromises. Stereotypically, it is no longer
necessary or possible to support nasty authoritarian
regimes on the grounds that they are the only
feasible alternative to local Communists and/or
Soviet, Cuban or Chinese influence. In this
interpretation, it was ministers in the more
economically liberal Western governments, buoyed
up by a sense that the liberal–democratic model was
sweeping to victory on the world stage, who took
the initiative to create the ‘good government’
agenda in the aid field, and thus to stimulate further
internal demands for political liberalisation within
developing countries. Timing alone makes this
reading of the evidence rather convincing. The
conspicuous collapse of the Soviet Bloc and model
came in late 1989; the pioneer ministerial speeches
heralding the arrival of political conditionality were
delivered in mid-1990 (see ‘The Emergence of the
“Good Government” Agenda: Some Milestones’). It is
also consistent with this interpretation that the
major bilateral aid donors appear to have been more
active in imposing political conditionality – in cutting
aid to ‘recalcitrant’ regimes – than in reorienting the
content of their aid programmes to provide positive
support to good government.
There is a debate about the relative importance of
‘external’ and ‘internal’ factors in stimulating moves
toward democracy and ‘good government’ in
different parts of the developing world. The
‘re-democratisation’ of Latin America has been
under way for more than a decade, and was already
largely complete by 1989. The pattern in East and
South-East Asia was similar but more patchy. Taiwan
and South Korea had long been gradually evolving
more pluralistic and less repressive polities;
opposition groups in many countries in the region
drew inspiration from the ‘Cory phenomenon’ in
the Philippines in 1986 – the peaceful overthrow of
the Marcos dictatorship after a civil revolt. The
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‘demonstration effects’ of these processes are
complex. We know that the collapse of the Soviet
Bloc had a major influence in sub-Saharan Africa,
and helped to bring about the current wave of
actual and promised democratisation. But there is in
general plenty of scope to differ about exactly what
caused what. In this IDS Bulletin, Denis Osborne
insists on the depth of disillusion with the ‘anciens
regimes’ in developing countries and the strength of
internal demands for good government. By contrast,
Carol Lancaster suggests that even one of the
pioneer moves in the current democratisation of
sub-Saharan Africa, the convening of a ‘national
conference’ in Benin in 1989, was triggered by the
World Bank’s refusal to come to the economic
rescue of a bankrupt government until it could
show that it had popular consent for its economic
policy.
The world is on a ‘democracy wave’ and particular
Western governments and international
organisations at times play important roles in driving
the wave onward. General discussions about the
relative importance of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ factors
in stimulating democratisation may not prove very
enlightening. The causes are complex, and the
‘external–internal’ distinction may be difficult to
make in practice. To obtain a better sense of the
future, it is more fruitful to look at the other reasons
given by Carol Lancaster for the emergence of the
good government agenda in Washington. She
provides two. One is that, for a range of reasons,
including the end of its Cold War rationale, foreign
aid is losing its domestic political constituency in the
USA. Notions of good government, including
democracy and civil rights, do however strike a
positive chord with parts of the American electorate.
The good government agenda thus reflects in part
an attempt to recreate a domestic political base for
foreign aid. Lancaster’s second reason is very
different, and indeed reflects the fact that there are,
among the aid donors, (at least) two different good
government agendas sharing the same umbrella.
The first agenda – which I will label the ‘liberal
democratic agenda’ – is the one discussed above. It
has four defining features: 
z it largely originates from and has been articulated
by leading Western politicians, often those who
have little record of concern with development
issues; 
z it has become entrenched in the formal policies
of the main Western bilateral aid donors;3
z the content is broad and sweeping: the assertion
that economic growth, competitive (multi-party)
democracy, the market economy, respect for
human rights, reduced levels of military
expenditure and, in some cases, socioeconomic
equity, are interrelated and mutually self-
sustaining; and 
z there is a willingness to impose political
conditionality in its starker form: no democracy or
civil rights, then no aid.
The second agenda – the ‘process of government’
agenda – has essentially been constructed by the
World Bank. The latest and most formal statement is
the Bank’s Governance and Development (1992). The
Bank was in the ‘good government’ business first;
the pioneer document is in its Sub-Saharan Africa:
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (November 1989).
As Carol Lancaster explains, the Bank’s concern with
this subject arises in part from an imperative need to
explain why the policies of structural adjustment and
economic liberalisation which it had long been
urging on African governments did not seem to
work even when adopted. Something else was
wrong. The tentative answer was that the required
administrative and governmental framework was not
in place. In a wide variety of ways – corruption,
secrecy in policymaking, lack of accountability,
disregard of the law, lack of benign concern for the
private sector, political exploitation of the public
sector – African governments were making it very
difficult for the correct economic policies to work as
they should.
The focus on ‘governance’ was the World Bank’s
answer to this dilemma. It avoided making explicit,
but never entirely hid, the fact that its prime concern
was with sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank’s agenda had
‘bureaucratic’ rather than ‘political’ origins. Its staff
have undertaken a great deal of research on
governance issues. The Bank avoids the kind of broad
assertions about the correlates of ‘good government’
made by the bilateral donors (see above). Its overt
focus is not on type of regime (e.g. whether
democratic, authoritarian, etc.), but on more
pragmatic-sounding issues about the process of
government – accountability, the nature of the
policymaking process, information, the role of law,
etc. (See my contribution to this IDS Bulletin.)
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These two different agendas are not contradictory.
Lancaster suggests, for example, that the World
Bank’s emphasis on information and open
policymaking in practice leads it very close to
endorsing multi-party democracy and civil liberties.
Further, there are signs of merger between the two:
terms which the World Bank initially identified as
key dimensions of good government – accountability,
information, transparency, rule of law – now appear
routinely in statements from bilateral donors. The
point is that there are different actors with different
interests using the same terms. If there is an element
of First World conspiracy against the Third World in
emergence of the good government agenda, then it
is not simple conspiracy.
Do we have a complete explanation?
Suppose we accept the propositions above that 
(a) the ‘liberal democratic’ variant of the good
government agenda stems essentially from the
demise of global Soviet–Western competition; and
(b) the ‘process of government’ agenda represents
mainly an attempt by the World Bank to redefine
the problems it faces when its own economic
doctrine is actually tested on countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and found wanting. Have we reached
the heart of the issue? Are these the essential
mechanisms at work?
Some sceptics suggest that there is a third political
motivation: the search for respectable arguments to
justify further and further cuts in Third World aid. If
countries can be labelled as ‘badly governed’, then it
becomes very difficult to find grounds to oppose
such cuts. John-Jean Barya however argues that
there are deeper and more material forces and
interests at work. He views political conditionality as
another ideological device to reinforce the
hegemony in Africa of the industrial nations and the
aid agencies – and ultimately the interests of global
finance capital. The particular way in which he makes
this argument raises many questions. Critics will
perhaps tend to seize on the apparent contradiction
between (a) his assertion that finance capital has
serious interests in (sub-Saharan) Africa and (b) the
major concern in development policy institutions
that Western capital appears to have been
progressively withdrawing from the region over
recent decades. Even the rather vigorous adoption of
policies of structural adjustment and economic
liberalisation by countries such as Ghana has failed to
reverse this trend.
What are the political interests of finance capital in
Africa? More generally, why would support for
political conditionality and thus for multi-party
democracy, civil liberties, etc. be in the interests of
foreign capital, in Africa or elsewhere? Is it because
(some categories of) foreign capital find it easier to
buy stable political support in liberal democratic
regimes through their control of and influence over
the mass media and political parties? These are all
unfashionable questions, at least in the donor
countries. Because notions of ‘good government’
strike a responsive chord in most quarters, there is a
danger that such critical questions about what is
going on behind this ‘facade’ will not be seriously
addressed. Marxist scholars tend to be rather good at
searching for deeper material interests and forces
behind ‘facades’. Of the few who remain in business,
are there any turning their attention to political
conditionality?
Are the aid donors justified?
The most widespread argument against political
conditionality and the good government agenda
more widely is that they constitute ‘violations of
sovereignty’: interference, by aid donor nations and
the multilateral agencies which they control, in the
internal affairs of other states. Geoffrey Hawthorn
examines this claim and finds that it cannot be
defended in terms of political theory or the laws and
conventions governing interstate relations. If aid is
intended to help improve the welfare of the citizens
of recipient nations, the donor has the obligation to
ensure that aid goes to those governments most
likely to use it so as to attain this goal.4 The problems
arise not at this level of principle, but in the process
of making judgements about which recipient
governments can genuinely be said to be practising
good government. In Hawthorn’s view, there is no
justification for defining the concept narrowly such
that it is identified with particular constitutional or
institutional forms like multi-party competitive
democracy. His own definition of good government
– that which is best suited in particular circumstances
to maximising the benefits of social cooperation –
may be more defensible on ethical and theoretical
grounds. Is it however practically useful? 
Hawthorn directs us towards the policy issues which
occupy most of this IDS Bulletin. What is good
government? Whose definitions of good
government can be trusted? Are the donor agencies
able and competent to define good government and
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to implement policies to encourage it? The emphasis
of several of the articles is on what academics
sometimes term the contrast between intentions
and outcomes – the kinds of processes summarised
in the popular English aphorism: ‘The road to Hell is
paved with good intentions’. For example, few
people would dissent in principle from the spirit or
much of the substance of the recent words of the
British Minister for Overseas Development on the
subject:
By good government, I mean the attitude and
conduct of those responsible for administration,
right down to grass roots level. Even where these
are right, the best plan of action and the highest-
minded intentions will fail if those who
implement them are not equal to the task. So
training is vital. Respect for the rights of the
individual is indispensable to good government.
Mutual trust must be established between those
in government and the governed.
This means accountability and transparency in the
decision-making process. It means political
pluralism with free and fair elections. It means the
rule of law and freedom of expression. It means
far less spending on military hardware and war-
making and much more on primary schools and
healthcare. It means fighting the cancers of graft
and nepotism.5
To translate these principles and attitudes into
effective action however proves to be problematic in
several major respects.
One major question is whether the vision of good
government being promoted is the right one. John
Healey, Richard Ketley and Mark Robinson jointly
address the question of the link between democracy
and economic policy. It is implicit in the ‘liberal
democratic’ variant of the good government agenda
that democratically elected governments will make
and implement better economic policy decisions. Is
this likely to be so in sub-Saharan Africa? The
evidence is unclear and ambiguous. One certainly
cannot reject the possibility, but should not have high
expectations. Many other factors also affect the
quality of economic decision-making.
My own contribution is an examination of the World
Bank’s position paper (Governance and Development
1992), which is explicitly focused on those dimensions
of governance impinging most directly on economic
performance. Because this position paper is based on
considerable experience and research, it generally
avoids the simplistic and erroneous assertions
sometimes emanating from the foreign ministries of
bilateral aid donors. The World Bank is increasingly
likely to set the agenda of practical research and
experimentation in the field. But it will hopefully
modify its own ideas considerably in the process.
Some of its key ideas, notably ‘accountability’, are
instinctively appealing but provide very limited
practical guidance to dealing with the real world. The
Bank’s treatment of law reveals a strong Western
and, more especially, American bias. The authors of
Governance and Development seemed surprisingly
uninterested in learning about the kind of
governance practised in countries which have been
economically successful in recent decades, notably
those of East Asia. Overall, the Bank’s position is a
mixture of informed good sense and Western
(liberal) ideological bias. It is useful in parts and
misleading or inadequate in others. It does not
provide a good guide to good government generally.
Mike Faber makes a similar case when looking at the
recent guidelines on the treatment of foreign direct
investors emanating from the international financial
institutions in Washington. Such guidelines are
important, for they constitute some of the most
precise and direct signals available to Third World
governments on what they should be doing to
attract foreign investment. Yet the guidelines are
formalistic and legalistic, and make no mention of
the wide range of governance issues which actually
shape the decisions of potential foreign investors.
Are the arbiters of what constitutes good
government competent to bear the heavy burden
that they have chosen to assume?
Mark Robinson asks the same question in relation to
the practice of political conditionality. The validity of
arguments in its favour depend in large part on the
aid donors having the capacity to implement
conditionality intelligently and effectively. That in turn
implies that they should not frequently find that they
have lost control of the situation and cease to
exercise any kind of influence. Research on economic
conditionality indicates that conditions imposed by
the donors may often be evaded by recipient
governments.6 There is less experience of political
conditionality. However Mark Robinson is able to
identify some of the factors that influence whether
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it is likely to work, and suggests that it is likely to be
effective only under relatively restricted conditions.
(Carol Lancaster provides some useful parallel
comments on the factors which influence the
capacity of the World Bank to raise ‘governance’
issues with its clients.)
Aid for better government?
Although there are reasons to be sceptical and
cautious about the good government agenda,
relatively few people are likely to oppose or reject it
totally. For there is a great deal of bad government
around in the world, and the human costs are
incalculable, whether they appear to us dramatically
in the shape of anarchic chaos and bloodshed in
Bosnia and Somalia; more prosaically in the shape of
routinised repression and economic mismanagement
in Peru, Haiti and Myanmar (Burma); or even more
insidiously in the form of decreasing tolerance of
open political debate and political dissent by elected
governments in some of the industrial nations. If one
is to try to make the best of an imperfect world,
then there is a case for aid donors to at least
supplement political conditionality with aid which is
actively targeted on improving governance. Two of
the articles focus on how this might be done.
Denis Osborne reviews the range of actions that
donors might support, while David Leonard presents
the outlines of a specific and highly innovative
proposal to strengthen the professional competence
of the top civil service in sub-Saharan Africa by
establishing regional professional cadres to which
national civil servants could ‘retreat’ when under
political pressure at home. During these periods of
‘retreat’ they would broaden their professional
experience by working in other countries or in
African regional or international organisations.
Emerging as it does from Leonard’s long experience
of researching on public administration in Africa, this
proposal constitutes the best example of pragmatic
‘lateral thinking’ that I have heard on the governance
issue.
One of the great attractions of Leonard’s scheme is
that it could (and should) be run at African regional
level by Africans; all that is required of aid donors is
modest funding. For this addresses what may be in
practice one of the biggest constraints to using aid
to promote better governance: the understandable
fears of many people in the Third World that ‘good
government’ is a cover for the industrial nations to
exercise more direct political control – a
re-colonisation – and advance some interest of their
own. Speaking for many people from Africa and
other parts of the Third World, John-Jean Barya
asserts that:
The new political conditionalities have nothing to
do with the desire of Western countries to
actually encourage democracy in Africa. For a
long time, Western countries supported
dictatorship, for instance in Zaire, Liberia, Uganda
and Kenya. France distinguished itself in
supporting dictators with open military
interventions on their behalf against popular
opposition.
Barya’s first sentence may be incorrect; the world
may have changed. Like emissaries of poor countries
going to Washington and insisting that they have left
recent history behind, and that they now really do
believe in the free market, the open economy and
the price mechanism, the aid donors now perhaps
send emissaries to Africa to insist that everything
really has changed, that supporting dictators was a
mistake for which they are deeply sorry, and that
from now on it is democracy and good government
that really count. If the Third World remains sceptical
and suspicious, one should not be surprised. (And, if
those apologies for past support for dictatorship have
indeed been tendered, would they not be all the
more persuasive and effective if made public?)
The arguments for good government and political
conditionality have greater implications for the aid
process and for the behaviour of the aid donors
themselves than they appear so far to have realised.
Denis Osborne raises two of them at the level of
design and management of aid: donors should be
more transparent in their dealings with aid recipients,
and aid for good government should, like good
government itself, be pluralist, i.e. should have ‘many
small seemingly independent parts’. In the conclusion
to his article on the Washington guidelines for
attracting foreign direct investment, Mike Faber
points out that these guidelines are silent on the
ways in which the industrial nations manage both
their national economies and the global economy in
such a way as to consistently discourage investment
in the Third World. The roots of the problems that
afflict the South do not lie only in the South. Carol
Lancaster points out that the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), apparently the most conservative of the
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international financial institutions, has very recently
been quietly enforcing its own (uncomplicated) good
government agenda: cuts in military expenditure. The
industrial nations that control the IMF presumably
approve of this. How much more effective would
the policy be, and how much more credible would
First World protestations about good government
be, if the governments of the advanced countries
would support the IMF by putting real constraints on
the international arms trade! The aid donors’
demands for good government in the Third World
will be all the more credible and effective when they
display a commitment which extends well beyond
the insistence that the recipients do something
about this if they do not want to lose their aid.
Concluding comment: understanding
governance 
‘Good government’ has been rushed onto the aid
agenda by politicians. Many of the assumptions that
underlie it are questionable, and others are plain
wrong. We have long known that all the good
things identified in the good government agenda –
economic growth, electoral democracy, the market
economy, respect for human rights, reduced levels of
military expenditure and socioeconomic equity – do
not typically come in interrelated and mutually self-
sustaining packages.7 Development policy is made in
the same real world that obliges the British
government, for example, to sacrifice some very
highly cherished goals of economic policy in the
attempt to achieve others.
Now that good government is on the development
policy agenda, political scientists are being
commissioned and encouraged to work on the
practical implications. From a narrow professional
viewpoint, the good government agenda is
something of a gift from heaven. For the first time in
the history of aid, political scientists are believed to
have something useful to say about broader, strategic
issues.8 There will no doubt be something of an
adverse reaction once those who make development
policy realise that most ‘good government’ issues
have long been familiar to political scientists and
theorists,9 and that few sudden breakthroughs in
knowledge are likely. Even so, political scientists can
anticipate more attention in the future than in the
past. Those who welcome this attention will be
obliged to overcome their professional inclination to
stop when they have described and analysed, and be
willing to prescribe. The implied responsibilities are
very heavy. Many colleagues will not wish to accept
them. Those that do may consider looking again at
The Prince. It is four and a half centuries since
Machiavelli wrote this do-it-yourself guide to
effective statecraft. No significant attempt has been
made to update it, or to advise rulers how to govern
well in the interests of their citizens as well as in the
interests of themselves and their dynasties. If anyone
believes that they could contribute to such a project
in relation to contemporary developing countries, I
and my colleagues at the Institute of Development
Studies (IDS) would be pleased to hear from them.
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Notes
1 I am grateful to my colleague Gordon White for
help in launching this IDS Bulletin and to Denis
Osborne for providing the material on which ‘The
Emergence of the “Good Government” Agenda:
Some Milestones’ is based.
2 Various donors have at different times used aid as
a lever against human rights abuses.
3 And also the European Bank of Reconstruction
and Development, which was established by these
same bilateral donors after the ‘collapse’ of the
Soviet Bloc and the emergence of the good
government agenda.
4 The case in principle for banks to be concerned
with the governance practices of their borrowers
(who are generally national governments in the
case of the World Bank institutions and the IMF)
appears to be even stronger: on simple banking
principles, lenders could be said to have a clear
obligation to ensure that their borrowers are well
managed, and thus likely to be in a position to
service their loans. More extended conceptions of
bankers’ roles might indicate a positive duty to help
clients improve their management (governance).
5 Speech to the Commonwealth Press Union
Conference in Edinburgh, 22 June 1992.
6 See P. Mosley, J. Harrington and J. Toye (1991) Aid
and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based
Lending, Routledge (2 vols).
7 See, for example, A. Sen, ‘Public Action and the
Quality of Life in Developing Countries’, Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (November
1980). 
8 As opposed, for example, to advising on counter-
insurgency strategy or on issues of public
administration.
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9 However, as Dunn points out, modern political
theory has rarely concerned itself with the
question of ‘good government’ in the very
comprehensive sense in which the term is now
used in the aid debate; the focus has been on
narrower and more concrete issues of ‘good
organisation’ (J. Dunn (1986) ‘The Politics of
Representation and Good Government in Post-
colonial Africa’, in P. Chabal (ed.), Political
Domination in Africa; Reflections on the Limits of
Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:
161, fn 12). The ‘good government’ debate does at
least raise old issues in a new way. 
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